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Abstract 
In this paper we study the suitability of a new generation of CAPTCHA methods based 
on smartphone interactions. The heterogeneous flow of data generated during the 
interaction with the smartphones can be used to model human behaviour when 
interacting with the technology and improve bot detection algorithms. For this, we 
propose a CAPTCHA method based on the analysis of the information obtained during 
a single drag and drop task in combination with the accelerometer data. We evaluate 
the method by generating fake samples synthesized with Generative Adversarial Neural 
Networks and handcrafted methods. Our results suggest the potential of mobile sensors 
to characterize the human behaviour and develop a new generation of CAPTCHAs. The 
experiments are evaluated with HuMIdb1 (Human Mobile Interaction database), a novel 
multimodal mobile database collected for this work that comprises 14 mobile sensors 
acquired from 600 users. HuMIdb is freely available to the research community. 
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1. Introduction 
The research interest in smartphone devices has been constantly growing in the last 
years. The capacity of these devices to acquire, process, and storage a wide range of 
heterogeneous data offers many possibilities and research lines (e.g. user authentication 
                                                          
1 https://github.com/BiDAlab/HuMIdb  
[1][2][3][4], health monitoring [5][6][7], behaviour monitoring [8][9][10][11], etc). 
Besides, the usage of mobile phones is ubiquitous. According to [12], mobile lines 
exceeded world population in 2018, and the amount of smartphones devices sold 
surpassed world population in 2014 [13]. This is one of the fastest growing manmade 
phenomena ever, from 0 to 7.2 billion in barely three decades. In the same way, this 
widget has changed the way we access and create contents on the internet. Recent 
surveys reveal that nearly three quarters (72.6%) of internet users will access the web 
via their smartphones by 2025. In fact, almost 51% of web access are actually made 
through mobile phones [14].  
On the other hand, mobile web hazards are growing very fast as well. Malicious 
malware is also adapting to this new mobile era. Mobile bots employ the capacities of 
smartphones affecting multiples types of online services, such us: social media (e.g. 
mobile bots accounts propagate fake twitter messages [15]), ticketing/travel, e-
commerce, finance, gambling, ATO/Fraud, DDoS attacks, and price scrapping among 
others. According to [16], these mobile bots use cellular networks by connecting 
through cellular gateways. Mobile bots can perform highly advanced attacks while 
remaining hidden in plain sight. In addition, they are very unlikely to be detected by IP 
address blocking. [16] showed that 5.8% of all mobile devices on cellular networks are 
used in malicious bot attacks. In other study [17], researchers reveal that mobile fraud 
reached 150 million global attacks in the first half of 2018 with attack rates rising 24% 
year-over-year. 
In this context, new countermeasures against fraud adapted to mobile scenarios are 
necessary. One of the most popular methods to distinguish between humans and bots is 
known as CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and 
Humans Apart). These algorithms determine whether the user is human by presenting 
challenges associated to the cognitive capacities of the human beings. The most 
common challenges are: recognizing characters from a distorted image (text-based 
CAPTCHAs); identifying class-objects in a set of images (image-based CAPTCHAs); 
speech translation from distorted audios (sound-based audio CAPTCHAs); or newer 
systems that replace traditional cognitive tasks by a transparent algorithm capable of 
detecting bots and humans from their web behaviour [18]. However, recent advances 
in areas such as computer vision, speech recognition, or natural language processing 
have increased the vulnerabilities of CAPTCHA systems [19][20][21]. Major advances 
in deep learning applied in those areas enable the generation of synthetic data of very 
natural appearance, therefore increasingly difficult to detect if used by bots. 
Most of the current CAPTCHAs have been designed to be used in a web interaction 
based on mouse and keyboard interfaces. In this paper we explore the potential of 
mobile devices to detect human-machine interaction. The main contributions are as 
follows:  
i) Summary of relevant recent works in touchscreen biometrics and accelerometer 
signals for modelling and exploiting the interaction in smartphones. 
ii) The new public HuMIdb1 dataset (Human Mobile Interaction database) that 
characterizes the interaction of 600 users according to 14 sensors during normal 
human-mobile interactions in an unsupervised scenario with more than 300 different 
devices. 
iii) A new method to generate synthetic swipe gestures using Generative Adversarial 
Networks and samples acquired during real human-device interaction. This method 
allows to generate synthetic samples that mimic the human behaviour. 
iv) A new bot detection approach based on modelling the user behaviour in smartphone 
interaction using multiple inbuilt sensors: BeCAPTCHA. We also experiment with 
a particular implementation of the proposed approach by combining touch dynamics 
and accelerometer data from HuMIdb, acquired when the users perform swipe 
gestures. This is a very common gesture used in many touch interfaces (e.g. unlock 
devices, confirm will to advance to other step). 
v) Discussion of relevant CAPTCHA approaches in comparison with the proposed 
BeCAPTCHA. 
A preliminary version of this article was presented in [22]. This article significantly 
improves [22] in the following aspects:  
i) We significantly augment the positioning with respect to related works. 
ii) We improve the bot detection accuracy training with real and synthetic samples 
generated with the adversarial method proposed. 
iii) We provide a qualitative comparison with traditional CAPTCHA methods and their 
complementarity with the new method. 
iv) We provide an analysis of user perception about CAPTCHAs technologies: issues 
and ethics concerns. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the capacity of 
touchscreen, accelerometer and gyroscope mobile sensors for modeling human-
machine interaction and summarizes the main existing mobile databases incorporating 
touchscreen and accelerometer data. In section 3 we introduce HuMIdb, a new 
multimodal mobile database collected for this work that comprises 14 mobile sensors 
acquired from 600 users. Section 4 describes the proposed BeCAPTCHA architecture. 
Section 5 analyzes the results obtained. Section 6 makes a comparison with traditional 
CAPTCHA methods and the suitability of the proposed BeCAPTCHA to complement 
the existing ones. Finally, section 7 summarizes the conclusions and future work. 
2. Mobile Sensors for Modeling Human-Machine Interaction: 
Accelerometer and Touchscreen 
Accelerometer, gyroscope, gravity sensor, touchscreen gestures, keystrokes, light 
sensor, WiFi, Bluetooth, camera, and microphone are some examples of sensors/signals 
acquired by a smartphone while we interact with it or just carry it with us during our 
daily routines. Those data can be used to model human-machine interaction and human 
behavior. In this section we present examples of different research fields that exploit 
accelerometer, gyroscope and touch signals obtained or derived from mobile sensors. 
 Accelerometer and gyroscope are both useful to measure the movements that the 
smartphone is exposed to: the accelerometer measures the magnitude and direction 
of acceleration forces applied over the mobile device and the gyroscope measures 
orientation. These sensors have been studied for mobile user authentication with 
good results in the last years [23]. For example, in [24] they used these mobile 
sensors for user recognition through simple gestures like answering a call in four 
different user states: standing, sitting, walking, and running. In other example, 
Gafurov et al. [25] extracted gait patterns from a mobile device attached to the lower 
part of the leg in three directions: vertical, forward-backward, and sideways motion. 
They achieved error rates between 5% and 9% for gait authentication combining all 
three acceleration measures. Accelerometer has been also studied to measure the 
daily physical activities with the main goal of changing people’s sedentary lifestyle 
[26]. Mobile apps employing accelerometer and gyroscope to measure physical 
activity are broadly used among runners, athletes, and healthy people, resulting in a 
very profitable market.  In other research field, accelerometer and gyroscope has 
demonstrated to be a promising tool for Parkinson disease estimation, identifying 
Parkinson disease (PD) through physical activities (e.g. walking, standing, sitting, 
holding) [5] or hand tremor [27]. El-Zayat et al. [28] measured the extent of 
shoulder rotation using the gyroscope. In a similar way, researchers from Korea 
used the gyroscope sensor to measure the range of motion of the shoulder in subjects 
suffering from unilateral symptomatic shoulder. They found that this sensor shows 
an acceptable reliability and high correlation with manual goniometer readings [29]. 
 Touchscreen gestures involve all kind of finger movements that we perform over 
the smartphone screen (e.g. swipe, tap, zoom). These signals have been studied for 
user mobile authentication in the last years [1][2]. Nevertheless, it has been shown 
not to have enough discriminative power to replace traditional authentication 
technologies such as passwords or swipe patterns, but they achieve good 
performance in combination with other mobile biometric traits [30][31]. In other 
research fields, a recent study [32] demonstrates how touch gestures can 
discriminate between children and adults just with swipe and tap gestures achieving 
error rates under 5%. That work suggests that touch gestures are ruled by the 
neuromotor cortex, less developed in children. Touchscreen patterns also provide 
the possibility to measure aspects of cognitive function. As an example, Apple 
Research Kit includes tools for standard cognitive tests used in clinical research 
adapted for smartphone devices such as the spatial memory test, the paced 
auditory/visual serial addition test (PVSAT), and the simple reaction time test [33]. 
In other example, the Project EVO app is a mobile game that it is currently being 
tested in a wide range of clinical studies and patient populations including ADHD, 
autism, depression, traumatic brain injury, and, more recently, as a biomarker to 
assess Alzheimer in clinical trials [6]. 
The literature demonstrates the potential of mobile sensors to model inner human 
features (e.g. cognitive functions, neuromotor skills, and human behaviors/routines).   
2.1 Mobile Datasets with Touchscreen and Accelerometer Data 
Table 1 summarizes previous multimodal mobile databases that include at the same 
time accelerometer and touchscreen signals, and compares them with the new HuMIdb 
dataset introduced in the present paper.  
UMDAA-02 [34] is a multimodal mobile database that includes 14 mobile sensors: 
front camera, touchscreen, gyroscope, accelerometer, magnetometer, light sensor, GPS, 
Bluetooth, WiFi, proximity sensor, temperature sensor, and pressure sensor. The data 
was collected during 2 months from 48 volunteers in an unsupervised scenario with 248 
sessions per user in average and using the same smartphone (Nexus 5). In other work 
[36], the authors collect touch gestures, power consumption, accelerometer, gyroscope, 
and magnetometer mobile signals from 10 participants under laboratory conditions and 
with the same mobile device (supervised scenario) during a period of three hours. In 
Ref. Sensors #Users Sessions/user Supervised Public # Devices Task 
[34] 
13 (Tou, Acc, Blu, 
Cam, Gyr, GPS, 
Key, Lig, Mag, 
Press, Prox, Temp, 
WIFI) 
54 ~248 No Yes 1 Free 
[36] 
5 (Tou, Acc, Gyr, 
Mag, Pow) 
10 3 Hours Yes No 1 Free 
[37] 
3 (Touch, Acc, 
Gyr) 
217 ≤ 6 Sessions No Yes <217 Fixed 
HuMIdb 
14 (Tou, Acc, Blu, 
Gra, GPS, Gyr, 
Key, LAc, Lig, 
Mag, Mic, Ori, 
Prox, WIFI) 
600 ≤ 5 Sessions No Yes 600 Fixed 
Table 1: Summary of existing mobile databases incorporating at the same time Touchscreen (Tou) and Accelerometer (Acc) 
signals. Other sensors: App usage (App), Bluetooth (Blu), Front camera (Cam), Gravity (Gra), Gyroscope (Gyr), GPS, 
Keystroke (Key), Light sensor (Lig) Linear accelerometer (LAc), Magnetometer (Mag), Microphone (Mic), Orientation (Ori), 
Power consumption (Pow), Pressure (Press), Proximity (Prox), Rotation (Rot), Temperature (Temp), Web browsing (Web), 
WIFI. Task column shows whether the mobile sensors were recorded in the wild or while users completed prefixed tasks. 
 
 
 
[37] the authors collected a database of mobile touch on-line data named 
MobileTouchDB. The database is focused on mobile touch patterns and contains more 
than 64K on-line character samples performed by 217 users with a total of 6 sessions. 
They also acquired accelerometer and gyroscope signals under unsupervised 
conditions. 
3. The HuMIdb Database 
In this section we introduce the Human Mobile Interaction database (HuMIdb), a 
novel multimodal mobile database that comprises more than 5 GB from a wide range 
of mobile sensors acquired under unsupervised scenario. The database includes 14 
sensors (see Table 2 for the details) during natural human-mobile interaction performed 
by 600 users. For the acquisition, we implemented an Android application that collects 
the sensor signals while the users complete 8 simple tasks with their own smartphones 
and without any supervision whatsoever (i.e., the users could be standing, sitting, 
walking, indoors, outdoors, at daytime or night, etc.). The acquisition app was launched 
on Google Play Store and advertised in our research web site and various research 
mailing lists. After that, the participants were self-selected around the globe producing 
more varied participants than previous state-of-the-art mobile databases. All data 
captured in this database have been stored in private servers and anonymized with 
previous participant consent according to the GDPR (General Data Protection 
Regulation). 
The different tasks are designed to reflect the most common interaction with mobile 
devices: keystroke (name, surname, and a pre-defined sentence), tap (press a sequence 
of buttons), swipe (up and down directions), air movements (circle and cross gestures 
in the air), handwriting (digits from 0 to 9), and voice (record the sentence ‘I am not a 
robot’). Additionally, there is a drag and drop button between tasks (see Appendix A 
for details). 
The acquisition protocol comprises 5 sessions with at least 1 day gap among them. 
It is important to highlight that in all sessions, the 1-day gap refers to the minimum time 
between one user finishes a session and the next time the app allows to have the next 
session. At the beginning of each task, the app shows a brief pop-up message explaining 
the procedure to complete each task. The application also captures the orientation 
(landscape/portrait) of the smartphone, the screen size, resolution, the model of the 
device, and the date when the session was captured. 
Regarding the age distribution, 25.6% of the users were younger than 20 years old, 
49.4% are between 20 and 30 years old, 19.2% between 30 and 50 years old, and the 
remaining 5.8% are older than 50 years old. Regarding the gender, 66.5% of the 
participants were males, 32.8% females, and 0.7% others. Participants performed the 
tasks from 14 different countries (52.2%/47.0%/0.8% are European, American, and 
Asian respectively) using 179 different devices. 
Sensors Sampling Rate Features Power Consumption 
Accelerometer 200 Hz 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 Low 
L.Accelerometer 200 Hz 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 Low 
Gyroscope 200 Hz 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 Low 
Magnetometer 200 Hz 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑧 Low 
Orientation NA 𝑙 or 𝑝 Low 
Proximity NA 𝑐𝑚 Low 
Gravity NA 𝑚/𝑠2 Low 
Light NA 𝑙𝑢𝑥 Low 
TouchScreen E 𝑥, 𝑦, 𝑝 Medium 
Keystroke E key,  𝑝 Medium 
GPS NA 
Lat., Lon., Alt., 
Bearing, 
Accuracy 
Medium 
WiFi NA 
SSID, 
Level, 
Info, 
Channel, 
Frequency 
High 
Bluetooth NA SSID, MAC Medium 
Microphone 8 KHz Audio High 
Table 2: Description of all sensor signals captured in HuMIdb. E=Event-based acquisition. 
The timestamp parameter is captured for all sensors. 
 
Fig. 1 shows an example of the handwriting task (for digit “5”) and the information 
collected during the task. Note how a simple task can generate a heterogeneous flow of 
information related with the user behavior: the way the user holds the device, the power 
and velocity of the gesture, the place, etc.  
3.1 HuMIdb Research Opportunities 
In this paper we explore the potential of HuMIdb for bot detection, but the richness 
in number of sensors acquired and population diversity offer many other research 
possibilities. Some of the possible research lines to explore with this dataset include:  
 Demographic modeling: HuMIdb comprises users from the 4 continents and 12 
different countries. The database is diverse in gender and age of the participants.   
 Cross-sensor interoperability: HuMIdb includes signals from 140 different devices. 
Analyzing the impact of different device characteristics on human behavior is a 
challenging research line. 
 User recognition: HuMIdb comprises behavioral patterns from 600 users. 
Continuous authentication based on biometric behavioral patterns is a popular 
Figure 1: Full set of data generated during one of the HuMIdb task. 
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research line with applications in the security market. See for example [38] that 
could be extended to do continuous authentication. 
4. BeCAPTCHA: Bot detection in Smartphone Interaction 
HuMIdb offers the opportunity to model human behavior. Among the multiple 
applications, in this section we explore the use of human interaction to develop a new 
generation of CAPTCHA systems based on mobile inbuilt sensors. In this work we 
focus on building a CAPTCHA system based on swipe gestures (i.e. a drag and drop 
action when the user scrolls the Next button to the right in HuMIdb). We will model 
this gesture according to features obtained from the touchscreen and accelerometer in 
order to extract cognitive human features that help us to discriminate between bots and 
human users just with simple drag and drop gestures. To evaluate the CAPTCHA, we 
will employ human samples (from HuMIdb) and synthetic ones (bot-like samples). We 
assume a challenging scenario where the attacker (malicious bot developer) can 
generate synthetic gestures trying to mimic the sensor signals generated during human-
mobile interaction. The goal is to determine whether a simple swipe gesture has been 
performed by a human or generated by a bot.  
4.1 Feature Extraction: Characterizing Swipe Gestures 
To characterize swipe gestures from the touchscreen and accelerometer signals, we 
have adapted two feature sets previously employed in [35][39] for bot detection and 
user authentication respectively.  
The interaction of the user with the Touchscreen is defined by a time sequence 𝐬T =
{𝐱, 𝐲, 𝐩, 𝐭} with length N, composed by the coordinates {𝐱, 𝐲}, the pressures 𝐩 (when 
available), and the timestamps 𝐭. First, the coordinates {𝐱, 𝐲}  are normalized by the size 
of the screen. Second, the pressure is discarded as it is not available in most of the 
devices. Third, six global features are generated according to Table 3. 
The Accelerometer signal is defined by a sequence 𝐬A = {𝐱, 𝐲, 𝐳, 𝐭}. The feature set 
chosen for the accelerometer signal was adapted from [35], in which they calculate the 
mean, median, root-mean-square, and standard deviation of the three accelerometer 
axes {𝐱, 𝐲, 𝐳} for user authentication.  
4.2 Generating Human-Like Gestures: Fake Samples 
A swipe gesture can be defined by a spatial trajectory (sequence of points {𝐱, 𝐲}) and 
a velocity profile determined by the timestamp sequence 𝐭. To generate synthetic swipe 
patterns, we will follow two approaches: handcrafted synthesis and Generative 
Adversarial Network (GAN) synthesis. 
4.2.1 Method 1: Handcrafted Synthesis 
We observed that most of the human swipe trajectories obtained from our drag and 
drop task are linear. The handcrafted approach generates swipe trajectories according 
to a straight-line shape and a realistic velocity profile. For this, we first estimate the 
probability distribution of length and angle of human swipe gestures in HuMIdb. Note 
that the size and coordinates of each human swipe varies depending on the device 
features so we have normalized each one by the total size of the screen.  
The synthetic trajectories are defined by the initial point (𝑥0, 𝑦0), duration (𝑡𝑁−1 −
𝑡0), angle (𝛼), and the velocity profile {𝐯, 𝐭}. We have synthesized the fake trajectories 
according to distributions of these parameters fitted from human data (except for the 
Parameters Description 
Duration (𝐷) 𝑡𝑁−1 − 𝑡0 
Distance (𝐿) ‖(𝑥𝑁−1, 𝑦𝑁−1) − (𝑥0, 𝑦0)‖ 
Displacement (𝑃) ∑‖(𝑥𝑖+1 − 𝑥𝑖) − (𝑦𝑖+1 − 𝑦𝑖)‖
𝑁−1
𝑖=0
 
Angle (𝛼) tan−1(|(𝑥𝑁−1 − 𝑥0| |(𝑦𝑁−1 − 𝑦0|⁄ )  
Mean velocity (𝑉) 
1
𝑁
∑ ‖(𝑥𝑖+1 − 𝑥𝑖) − (𝑦𝑖+1 − 𝑦𝑖)‖ (𝑡𝑖+1 − 𝑡𝑖)⁄
𝑁−1
𝑖=0
 
Move Efficiency (𝐸)  𝑃 𝐿⁄  
Table 3: Touch features extracted for the characterization of the gestures. 
 
velocity profile). With the aim to emulate human behaviors, we spaced the points of the 
linear trajectory on a log scale (emulating a velocity profile with the initial acceleration 
observed in human samples).  
The accelerometer signals are synthesized as random sequences generated from a 
Gaussian distribution with mean and standard deviation estimated from real 
accelerometer signals from HuMIdb.  
4.2.2 Method 2: GAN Synthesis 
For this approach, we employ a GAN (Generative Adversarial Network) architecture 
firstly proposed by Goodfellow et al. [40], in which two neuronal networks, commonly 
named Generator and Discriminator, are trained in adversarial mode. The Generator 
tries to fool the Discriminator by generating fake samples (touch trajectories and 
accelerometer signals in this work) very similar to the real ones, while the Discriminator 
has to discriminate between the real samples and the fake ones created (see Fig. 2 for 
the details). Once the Generator is trained, then we can use it to synthesize swipe 
trajectories very similar to the real ones.  
The topology employed in both Generator and Discriminator consist of two LSTM 
(Long Short-Term Memory) layers followed by a dense layer, very similar to a recurrent 
GAN Generator 
Figure 2: The proposed architecture to train a GAN Generator of synthetic swipe gestures 
characterized by touch 𝐬Tෞ and accelerometer 𝐬Aෞ sequences. The Generator learns the human 
features of the swipe gestures and generate human-like ones from Gaussian Noise and human 
sequences 𝐬T, 𝐬A. 
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auto-encoder. The LSTM layers learn the time relationships of human swipe sequences, 
while the dense layer is used as a classification layer to distinguish between fake and 
real swipe trajectories in the Discriminator or to build synthetic mouse trajectories in 
the Generator. To synthesize accelerometer signals, we follow the same GAN 
architecture described before, but extending the input of the generator from {𝐱, 𝐲} swipe 
coordinates to {𝐱, 𝐲, 𝐳} accelerometer axes. 
4.3 Experimental Protocol 
Both GAN networks were trained using more than 10K human samples extracted 
from the HuMIdb. Training details: learning rate 𝛼 = 2 ∙ 10−4, Adam optimizer with 
𝛽1 = 0.5, 𝛽2 = 0.999, and 𝜀 = 10
−8. The system was trained for 50 epochs with a 
batch size of 128 samples for both Generator and Discriminator. The loss function was 
‘binary crossentropy’ for the Discriminator and ‘mean square error’ for the Generator.  
The model was trained and tested in Keras-Tensorflow.  
We generated 12K synthetic samples according to the two methods proposed. Once 
we have extracted the global features from human and synthetic swipe trajectories (up 
to 30K trajectories between both groups), we employ an SVM (Support Vector 
Machine) classifier with an RBF (Radial Basis Function). The experiments are divided 
into two different scenarios depending on the training data employed: once-class or 
multiclass. In the one-class scenario, we train the SVM classifier using only the human 
samples and test with both human samples and synthetic ones, in order to study whether 
the classifier is able to detect bots as abnormal human behavior. In the multiclass 
scenario, we train and test the SVM classifier with both human and synthetic samples 
in order to analyze whether the classifier can find discriminative features between both 
groups.  
In both scenarios, there is no overlap between train and test sets. For each SVM, we 
train the classifier by using the 70% of all samples and test with the 30% remaining 
(randomly chosen). Each experiment was repeated 5 times and the results were 
computed as the average of the 5 iterations.  
5. Results and Discussion 
Table 4 shows the bot detection errors for the different synthetic trajectories (in 
columns) generated in this work when comparing with the human ones. The results are 
presented in terms of EER (Equal Error Rate) defined as the point where FMR (False 
Match Rate) and FNMR (False Non-Match Rate) are equal.  
We observe that the results achieved for the one-class classification are significantly 
worse (higher errors) than those achieved in multiclass classification, as expected 
because synthetic samples are not considered when training the classifier. For one-class 
classification, the synthetic samples generated with GAN can fool the classifier more 
times than the other type of synthetic samples. The same applies to multiclass training.  
To better understand the results, Fig. 3 shows the probability functions of the six 
features proposed for the three types of touch signals (i.e. humans and both synthetic 
generation methods). Synthetic distributions do not completely fit the human 
distributions, but they present a behavior like the human samples. First, we can observe 
that the Move Efficiency of the handcrafted trajectories is equal to 1, this happens 
because in swipe trajectories with straight line shape the distance and displacement are 
equal. This is the reason why the one-class classifier detects these synthetic trajectories 
so easily. Note that the Duration (length) of both handcrafted and GAN synthetic swipes 
were computed as a Gaussian distribution with the same mean and standard deviation 
as the human ones so both probability distributions are equal. Regarding Distance and 
 Bot Generation 
SVM Training Handcrafted GAN 
One-class (Tou) 38.3 46.7 
Multiclass (Tou) 2.2 4.1 
One-class (Tou+Acc) 0 23.2 
Multiclass (Tou+Acc) 0 0.8 
Cross-Multiclass (Tou+Acc) 10.1 7.2 
Table 4: Equal Error Rate (%) in bot detection for the different scenarios including human 
and synthetic samples (i.e. Handcrafted, and GAN). In Cross-Multiclass experiments, the 
SVM is trained with fake samples of one generation method and evaluated with the second 
one (e.g. the 10.1% was obtained training with HC samples and testing with GAN samples). 
Displacement, the GAN trajectories fit worse than the handcrafted ones. We suggest 
that the main reason for this is that the GAN network generates smoother swipe 
trajectories than the human ones without abrupt direction changes, causing longer 
displacements in less distance (like a parabolic function). Finally, the Velocity Profile 
of both synthetic swipe trajectories are very similar to the human ones, the initial 
acceleration applied to the function-based trajectories reproduces human behaviors with 
great similarity while the GAN network learns very realistic Velocity Profiles of human 
swipe trajectories as well.  
Figure 3: Probability functions of the six global features for human, handcrafted, and GAN swipe 
trajectories. 
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The combination of touch and accelerometer features outperform the previous results 
with more than 50% error reduction in bot detection. These results suggest the potential 
of multimodal approaches. Finally, Table 4 shows the performance when the generation 
method of fake samples used for training and testing are different. As it is expected, the 
EER increases when synthetic training samples are not generated with the same method 
employed for the evaluation. Even in this challenging scenario, the system can maintain 
a correct classification rate around 90%. 
6. Comparison and Complementarity with the State-of-the-Art 
Table 5 shows some of the main features of different existing CAPTCHA methods. 
Audio, image, and text-based CAPTCHAs have been defeated by machine learning 
algorithms. As an example, in [20] the authors designed an AI-based system called 
UnCAPTCHA to break Google’s most challenging audio reCAPTCHAs. The text-
based CAPCTHA was defeated by Bursztein et al. [19] with 98% accuracy using a ML-
based system to segment and recognize the text. Finally, the last version of the Google 
CAPTCHA, named reCAPTCHAv3, is transparent for the user and measures mouse 
dynamics and web browsing interactions between the user and the web site to decide 
whether the user is a bot or not. This version was recently hacked in [21] by synthetizing 
mouse trajectories using reinforcement learning techniques. The main problem of these 
CAPTCHA methods is that they only measure cognitive human skills (e.g. character 
Method Cognitive Behavioral Usability Attack Protection 
Audio CAPTCHA ***  * * * 
Image CAPTCHA *** * * * 
Text CAPTCHA *** * * * 
reCAPTCHA v3 * ** *** * 
Touch CAPTCHA [41] ** *** *** Unknown 
Gesture CAPTCHA [42] ** *** ** *** 
BeCAPTCHA (Ours) ** *** *** *** 
Table 5: Characteristics of several CAPTCHA methods. We rate each factor as low (*), medium 
(**) and high (***).  
 
recognition from distorted images, class-objects identification in a set of images or 
speech translation from distorted audios). Trying to ensure a very accurate bot detection 
makes these CAPTCHAs difficult to perform even for humans. The main goal of new 
generation bot detection algorithms like reCAPTCHA v3 is to focus more in human 
behavioral skills rather than cognitive ones, as behavioral skills reveal inner human 
features useful for bot detection just with simple gestures like swipes. In that line of 
work exploiting simple natural behaviors instead of complex cognitive challenges, two 
works closely related to our proposed BeCAPTCHA are [41] and [42]. 
In [41], the authors developed a gesture-based CAPTCHA for mobile devices in 
which the participants are asked to move objects over the screen to solve the 
CAPTCHA. In the paper the authors do not evaluate the performance of the proposed 
CAPTCHA system to discriminate between human and bots. Their algorithm 
demonstrated to be more user friendly than other existing methods like Google 
reCAPTCHA. Their success rate (measured as the percentage of CAPTCHA tests that 
users completed successfully) is 100% versus 91% achieved by the Google 
reCAPTCHA method.  Hupperich et al. [42] proposed a mobile CAPTCHA system 
based on performing simple gestures (e.g. fishing, hammering, drinking) while holding 
the mobile device to solve the CAPTCHA. For this, they used the data extracted from 
the accelerometer and gyroscope and applied machine learning classifiers (Bagging 
Tress, Random Forest and KNN). Their results achieved over 90% of performance for 
gesture recognition, demonstrating the suitability of sensor-based CAPTCHA to 
improve traditional CAPTCHAs in a mobile scenario. These methods were not 
Figure 4: Block diagram of multimodal bot detection [43]. The response of the bot detector is a 
combination of responses from different modules. The bot detector proposed in this work can be 
used independently or in combination with existing bot detectors.    
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evaluated when synthetic samples are used to attack the system and their performance 
analysis were focused on the success rate of humans solving the CAPTCHA challenges.  
It is important to highlight that our proposed BeCAPTCHA is compatible with 
previous CAPTCHA technologies and it could be added as a new cue to improve 
existing bot detection schemes in a multiple classifier combination [43] (see Fig. 4). In 
fact, BeCAPTCHA can be easily extended to consider other inputs beyond the swipe 
signals considered in our experiments, e.g.: web browsing, texting, solving other 
CAPTCHAs, etc.  
6.1 User Perception Survey 
At the end of the acquisition, the participants in the HuMIdb database completed a 
questionnaire about CAPTCHA technologies and ethics issues. The survey includes 
responses from 600 participants from 14 different countries (see Section 3 for details). 
The survey included three questions related to the understanding and perception of 
CAPTCHA technologies by the users:  
 Question 1: ‘Do you know what is a CAPTCHA system?’ 33% of the participants 
didn’t know, which shows the lack of information about one of the most 
common malicious malware in mobile devices nowadays.  
 Question 2: ‘Do you think mobile apps that use biometric user information are 
privacy invasive?’ most of them (76%) answered affirmative.  
 Question 3: ‘If this information were useful to improve your security and your 
confidence in web navigation, would you be willing to share it anonymously?’ 
82% of the participant’s answers were also affirmative.  
According to these results, we can conclude that most mobile users are reluctant to 
share their biometric information in mobile apps, but they are willing to share it in case 
they are given a clear benefit in terms of security and confidence. 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
We introduce a new bot detection system for smartphones based on the analysis of 
behavioral information from inbuilt sensors: BeCAPTCHA. Results are provided by 
combining touchscreen and accelerometer data, but the methods are presented in a 
general way and therefore BeCAPTCHA directly allows incorporating information 
from additional sensors. 
As we discussed in the introduction, the behavioral information acquired through 
mobile sensors describe inner human features, such as neuromotor abilities, cognitive 
skills, human routines, and habits. All these patterns can help to develop new bot 
detection algorithms for mobile scenarios. Our goal in this paper has been to go a step 
forward on the bot detection field focused in mobile scenarios by implementing 
CAPTCHA methods that exploit mobile sensor signals during human-mobile 
interactions. For this, we present a novel multimodal mobile database HuMIdb that 
comprises 14 mobile sensors captured from 600 users in an unsupervised scenario. 
Although in this paper we focus on the HuMIdb for bot detection, this new dataset 
offers many other research opportunities related to modeling and exploiting the human-
machine interaction in smartphones. 
We have evaluated our proposed BeCAPTCHA approach combining swipe 
touchscreen trajectories and accelerometer signals extracted from HuMIdb (human 
samples) vs very realistic synthetic trajectories generated with GAN deep learning (bot 
samples). We provide results in various experimental configurations, considering or not 
synthetic bot data for training BeCAPTCHA (multi-class and one-class, respectively). 
Bot detection results for one-class classification just using touch gestures are poor, but 
the combination with accelerometer data and realistic multi-class training reveal the 
potential of our approach, with results against very realistic synthetic attacks around 
90% bot detection accuracy. We strongly believe that the combination of these 
behavioral signals with traditional CAPTCHA methods can harden significantly 
existing algorithms for bot detection. The expected improvements are even larger when 
considering additional mobile sensors in extended BeCAPTCHA implementations 
beyond touchscreen and accelerometer data. 
For future works, we will explore the addition of new sensors on top of touchscreen 
and accelerometer data (as available in our HuMIdb dataset,2 see Section 3), new 
approaches that exploit the complementarity between tasks and sensors, and smart 
fusion to exploit multiple sensors and the heterogeneity of the data [43]. Moreover, we 
will analyze the potential of HuMIdb for other fields such active and continuous 
authentication, user recognition, and demographic modeling, among others.  
                                                          
2 https://github.com/BiDAlab/HuMIdb  
Figure 5: The mobile interfaces designed for the 8 mobile HuMI tasks: a) keystroking, b) swipe 
up, c) tap and double tap, d) swipe down, e) circle hand gesture, f) cross hand gesture, g) voice, 
and h) finger handwriting. 
a) b) c) d) 
f) g) h) e) 
Appendix A. Android App and Task Description 
Fig. 5 shows all tasks included in the HuMI database. The task a is designed to 
acquire keystroking from fixed and free text. In tasks b and d, the users have to perform 
both swipe up and swipe down gestures to complete both tasks, meanwhile the task c is 
focused on tap gestures. Tasks e and f are designed to draw in the air with the 
smartphone a circle and a cross respectively. Task g records the user saying ‘I am not 
a robot’, and finally, in task h the user has to draw with the finger the digits 0 to 9 over 
the touchscreen. Note that the 14 sensors available (see Section 3) are acquired during 
the execution of all tasks, although some sensors present a key role in some of them. 
For example, the accelerometer signal is captured during the entire session even though 
it could be more relevant in tasks e and f. This heterogeneous information can be used 
to improve the patterns obtained from the main sensor for each task. Additionally, all 
tasks have a right swipe button that is acquired in addition to the swipe patterns.  
Acknowledgements 
This work has been supported by projects: PRIMA (H2020-MSCA-ITN-2019-
860315), TRESPASS-ETN (H2020-MSCA-ITN-2019-860813), BIBECA (RTI2018-
101248-B-I00 MINECO/FEDER), and BioGuard (Ayudas Fundación BBVA a 
Equipos de Investigación Científica 2017). Spanish Patent Application P202030066. 
References 
 
[1] J. Fierrez, A. Pozo, M. Martinez-Diaz, J. Galbally, A. Morales, Benchmarking 
Touchscreen Biometrics for Mobile Authentication, IEEE Transactions on 
Information Forensics and Security, 13, 11, 2720-2733, 2018. 
[2] M. Frank, R. Biedert, E. Ma, I. Martinovic, D. Song, Touchalytics: On the 
applicability of touchscreen input as a behavioural biometric for continuous 
authentication, IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 8, 
1, 136-148, 2013. 
[3] J. V. Monaco, C. Tappert, The partially observable hidden Markov model and 
its application to keystroke dynamics, Pattern Recognition, 76, 449-462, 2018. 
[4] V. M. Patel, R. Chellappa, D. Chandra, B. Barbello, Continuous User 
Authentication on Mobile Devices: Recent Progress and Remaining 
Challenges, IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 33, 4, 49-61, 2016. 
[5] M. V. Albert, S. Toledo, M. Shapiro, K. Kording, Using mobile phones for 
activity recognition in Parkinson's patients, Frontiers in Neurology, 3, 158, 
2012. 
[6] MarketWatch, Akili Interactive Labs announces partnership with Pfizer to test 
video game in people at risk of Alzheimer's disease, Retrieved March 12, 2020 
from https://www.marketwatch.com/press-release/akili-interactive-labs-
announces-partnership-with-pfizer-to-test-video-game-in-people-at-risk-of-
alzheimers-disease-2014-01-09 
[7] Arroyo-Gallego, et al., Detection of Motor Impairment in Parkinson's Disease 
Via Mobile Touchscreen Typing, IEEE Transactions Biomedical Engineering, 
64, 9, 1994-2002, 2017. 
[8] L. Pei, R. Chen, J. Liu, T. Tenhunen, H. Kuusniemi, Y. Chen, Inquiry-Based 
Bluetooth Indoor Positioning via RSSI Probability Distributions, in 
Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Advances in Satellite and 
Space Communications, Athens, Greece, 2010. 
[9] M. Chen, Y. Zhang, Y. Li, S. Mao, V.C.M. Leung. EMC: Emotion-aware 
mobile cloud computing in 5G, IEEE Network, 29, 2, 32-38. 
[10] I. Dua, A. U. Nambi, C.V. Jawahar, V. Padmanabhan, AutoRate: How 
attentive is the driver?, in Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International 
Conference on Automatic Face & Gesture Recognition, 1-8, 2019. 
[11] M. Tavakolian, C. G. B. Cruces, A. Hadid, Learning to Detect Genuine versus 
Posed Pain from Facial Expressions using Residual Generative Adversarial 
Networks, in Proceedings of the 14th IEEE International Conference on 
Automatic Face & Gesture Recognition, 14-18, 2019. 
[12] Mobile World Congress 2018, The number of mobile lines exceeds the world 
population for the first time, Retrieved March 12, 2020 from 
https://elpais.com/tecnologia/2018/02/27/actualidad/1519725291_071783.ht
ml 
[13] Independent, There are officially more mobile devices than people in the 
world, Retrieved March 12, 2020 from https://www.independent.co.uk/life-
style/gadgets-and-tech/news/there-are-officially-more-mobile-devices-than-
people-in-the-world-9780518.html 
[14] CNBC, Nearly three quarters of the world will use just their smartphones to 
access the internet by 2025, Retrieved March 12, 2020 from 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/24/smartphones-72percent-of-people-will-
use-only-mobile-for-internet-by-2025.html 
[15] Z. Chu, S. Gianvecchio, H. Wang, S. Jajodia, Who is tweeting on Twitter: 
human, bot, or cyborg?, in Proceedings of the 26th Annual Computer Security 
Applications Conference, ACVM, 21-30, 2019. 
[16] Distil Research Lab Threat Report. Mobile Bots: the next evolution of Bad 
bots. Retrieved March 12, 2020 from 
https://resources.distilnetworks.com/whitepapers/research-lab-mobile-bots 
[17] Threat Metrix. Mobile Fraud Reaches 150 Million Global Attacks in First Half 
of 2018 with Attack Rates Rising 24% Year-Over-Year. Retrieved August 26, 
2019 from https://www.threatmetrix.com/press-releases/mobile-fraud-
reaches-150-million-global-attacks-in-first-half-of-2018-with-attack-rates-
rising-24-year-over-year-reveals-threatmetrix/ 
[18] Google reCAPTCHA v3. 2019. Retrieved March 12, 2020 from 
https://www.google.com/recaptcha/intro/v3.html 
[19] E. Bursztein, M. Martin, J. Mitchell, Text-based CAPTCHA strengths and 
weaknesses, in Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and 
Communications Security (ACM '11), 125-138, 2011. 
[20] K. Bock, D. Patel, G. Hughey, D. Levin, unCaptcha: a low-resource defeat of 
recaptcha's audio challenge, in Proceedings of the 11th USENIX Workshop 
on Offensive Technologies, Vancouver, 2017. 
[21] I. Akrout, A. Feriani, M.Akrout, Hacking Google reCAPTCHA v3 using 
Reinforcement Learning. arXiv:1903.01003, 2019. 
[22] A. Acien, A. Morales, J. Fierrez, R. Vera-Rodriguez, I. Bartolome, Be-
CAPTCHA: Detecting Human Behavior in Smartphone Interaction using 
Multiple Inbuilt Sensors, in AAAI-20 workshop on Artificial Intelligence for 
Cyber Security (AICS), New Yok, USA, 2020. 
[23] D. Deb, A. Ross, A. K. Jain, K. Prakah-Asante, K. V. Prasad, Actions Speak 
Louder Than (Pass) words: Passive Authentication of Smartphone Users via 
Deep Temporal Features. In Proceedings of the 12th IAPR International 
Conference on Biometrics, Crete, Greece, 2019. 
[24] S. Barra, G. Fenu, M. de Marsico, A. Castiglione, M. Nappi, Have you 
permission to answer this phone?, in Proceedings of the IEEE International 
Workshop on Biometrics and Forensics, Sassari, Italy, 1-7, 2018. 
[25] D. Gafurov, K. Helkala, T. Søndrol, Biometric Gait Authentication Using 
Accelerometer Sensor, Journal of Computers, 1, 7, 51-59, 2006. 
[26] L. Sun, D. Zhang, B. Li, B. Guo, S. Li, Activity Recognition on an 
Accelerometer Embedded Mobile Phone with Varying Positions and 
Orientations, Ubiquitous Intelligence and Computing, 548-562, 2010. 
[27] N. Kostikis, D. Hristu-Varsakelis, M. Arnaoutoglou, C. Kotsavasiloglou. 
Smartphone-based Evaluation of Parkinsonian Hand Tremor: Quantitative 
Measurements vs Clinical Assessment Scores, in Proceedings of the 36th 
Annual International Conference of the IEEE Engineering in Medicine and 
Biology Society, Chicago, IL, USA, 2014. 
[28] El-Zayat, B. Farouk, et al., Objective assessment of shoulder mobility with a 
new 3D gyroscope-a validation study, BMC musculoskeletal disorders, 12, 1, 
168, 2011. 
[29] SHIN, S. Han, et al., Within-day reliability of shoulder range of motion 
measurement with a smartphone, Manual Therapy, 17, 4, 298-304, 2012. 
[30] W. Shi, J. Yang, Y. Jiang, F. Yang, Y. Xiong, Senguard: Passive user 
identification on smartphones using multiple sensors, in Proceedings of the 
7th IEEE International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Computing, 
Networking and Communications, Shangai, China, 141-148, 2011. 
[31] A. Acien, A. Morales, R. Vera-Rodriguez, J. Fierrez, R. Tolosana, MultiLock: 
Mobile Active Authentication based on Multiple Biometric and Behavioral 
Patterns, in Proceedings of ACM Multimedia Workshop on Multimodal 
Understanding and Learning for Embodied Applications (MULEA'19), Nice, 
France, 2019. 
[32] A. Acien, A. Morales, J. Fierrez, R. Vera-Rodriguez, J. Hernandez-Ortega, 
Active detection of age groups based on touch interaction, IET Biometrics, 8, 
1, 101-108, 2018. 
[33] Apple Inc. Research Kit Active Tasks. Retrieved March 12, 2020 from 
http://researchkit.org/docs/docs/ActiveTasks/ActiveTasks.html 
[34] U. Mahbub, S. Sarkar, V. M. Patel, R. Chellappa, Active user authentication 
for smartphones: A challenge data set and benchmark results, in Proceedings 
of IEEE 8th International Conference on Biometrics Theory, Applications and 
Systems, New York, USA, 2016. 
[35] G. Li and P. Bours, Studying WiFi and Accelerometer Data Based 
Authentication Method on Mobile Phones, in Proceedings of the 2nd 
International Conference on Biometric Engineering and Applications, 
Amsterdam, Netherlands, 2018. 
[36] X. Liu, C. Shen, Y. Chen, Multi-source Interactive Behaviour Analysis for 
Continuous User Authentication on Smartphones, in Proceedings of Chinese 
Conference on Biometric Recognition, Urumchi, China, 2018. 
[37] R. Tolosana, J. Gismero-Trujillo, R. Vera-Rodriguez, J. Fierrez, J. Ortega-
Garcia, MobileTouchDB: Mobile Touch Character Database in the Wild and 
Biometric Benchmark, in Proceedings of IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer 
Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) Workshops, Long Beach, CA, USA, 
2019. 
[38] A. Acien, A. Morales, R. Vera-Rodriguez, J. Fierrez, Smartphone Sensors for 
Modeling Human-Computer Interaction: General Outlook and Research 
Datasets for User Authentication, submitted in IEEE Computer Society 
Signature Conference on Computers, Software and Application (COMPSAC), 
Madrid, 2020. 
[39] Z. Chu, S. Gianvecchio, H. Wang, Bot or Human? A Behavior-Based Online 
Bot Detection System. From Database to Cyber Security, Springer 
International Publishing, Cham, 432-449, 2018.  
[40] I. Goodfellow, et al., Generative adversarial nets, Advances in Neural 
Information Processing Systems, 2672-2680. 
[41] N. Jiang, H. Dogan, A gesture-based captcha design supporting mobile 
devices, in Proceedings of the 2015 British HCI Conference, pp. 202-207, 
2015. 
[42] T. Hupperich, K. Krombholz, T. Holz, Sensor captchas: On the usability of 
instrumenting hardware sensors to prove liveliness, in International 
Conference on Trust and Trustworthy Computing, Springer, Cham, 40-59, 
2016. 
[43] J. Fierrez, A. Morales, R. Vera-Rodriguez, D. Camacho, Multiple Classifiers 
in Biometrics. Part 2: Trends and Challenges, Information Fusion, 44, 103-
112, 2018. 
